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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
000O000

ELAINE S. SORENSEN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 870102 CA
Priority 14b

v.
CLIFFORD G. SORENSEN,
Defendant-Appellant,
000O000

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Pursuant to Rule 24(c) of the Rules of the Utah Court of
Appeals, Defendant/Appellant, Clifford G. Sorensen, submits
the

following

Reply

Brief

in

response

to

the

Brief

of

Respondent Elaine S. Sorensen.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a divorce case.

As was stated in Appellant's

initial Statement of the Case, it involves errors made by the
trial court in valuing the Appellant's dental practice; in
awarding attorney's fees and in requiring Appellant to pay a
portion of Respondent's expert witness fees.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
No additional facts need be set forth in connection with
this Reply Brief.
set

forth

in

his

Appellant relies on the Statement of Facts
principal

Brief

inclusively.
1

on

pages

2 through

13

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I
Appellant

raised

five issues on appeal.

Four of the

five have Utah cases directly on point and are dispositive in
Appellant's

favor.

The

fifth

issue,

(i.e.,

failure

to

consider accounts payable), should be decided in Appellant's
favor based on principles of common sense.
POINT II
A.
The

Appellant

properly

and

timely

objected

to

Respondent's attempt to place a value on the "goodwill" of
Dr. Sorensen's dental practice.

The trial court erred in

overruling that objection and admitting the evidence.
B.
Utah law is clear that the goodwill of a professional
such as a dentist is not an asset subject to division in a
divorce case.
Dr.

The trial court erred in placing a value on

Sorensen's

goodwill

and

subsequently

awarding

that

"asset" to him.
C.
The

trial

court

erred

in

including

Dr.

Sorensen's

accounts receivable as an asset which was ultimately awarded
to him.
are

Under Utah law, a professional's accounts receivable

deferred

income

from which ongoing

alimony payments are made.
2

child

support

and

D.
The trial court simply ignored Dr. Sorensen's current
accounts

payable

in

valuing

his

dental

practice

and

consequently the value assigned was at least $10,129.00 too
high.
POINT III
The evidence which Mrs, Sorensen presented in support of
her request

for attorney's

fees did

reasonableness, the necessity

not include proof on

of time expended,

commonly charged in divorce actions.

and

rates

Consequently, the award

should be vacated based on insufficient evidence.
POINT IV
The trial court erroneously ordered Dr. Sorensen to pay
one half of his wife's expert witness fees attributable to
the

real

behalf.

estate

appraiser

she

called

to

testify

on

her

This is contrary to existing Utah law and the award

should be vacated.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE CASES CITED AND RELIED ON
BY APPELLANT ARE DISPOSITIVE OF
THE ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL.
In his brief, Appellant has raised five errors committed
by the trial court.

3

1) It included goodwill as an asset of
Dr. Sorensen's dental practice;
2) It included accounts receivable as an
asset of Dr. Sorensen's dental practice;
3) It did not include accounts payable
when valuing the dental practice;
4) It awarded attorney's
insufficient evidence;

fees based

on

5) It incorrectly required Dr. Sorensen
to pay a portion of Mrs. Sorensen's
expert witness fees.
Of these five issues only the issue dealing with the accounts
payable does not have a Utah Supreme Court or Utah Court of
Appeals

case

which

addresses

the

issue

and

appropriate and applicable statement of law.
her brief, either

ignores

the holdings

provides

the

Respondent, in

of those cases or

unsuccessfully attempts to explain away the cases as having
no applicability.
GOODWILL
Jackson v. Caldwell, 18 Utah 2d 81, 415 P.2d 667 (Utah
1966) simply says that in Utah there can be no goodwill of a
business which depends for its existence upon the qualities
of the persons who carry it on. (i.e., professionals such as
lawyers, doctors, accountants and dentists.)

It is still the

law in Utah, as pronounced by the Utah Supreme Court.

It is

a position followed in other jurisdictions as well as Utah.
The

principle

of

stare

decisis

should

be

applied

and

Respondent's assertion that other jurisdictions have decided
4

the issue differently is simply not material.

It avoids the

issue as to what is the present law in Utah.
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE
Dogu v. Dogu, 552 P. 2d 1308

(Utah 1982) unequivocally

states that Dr. Dogu's professional

corporation's

accounts

receivable represented deferred income from which he was to
make his ongoing child support and alimony obligations.

The

trial court did not include those receivables as an asset of
the

corporation

and

the Utah

Supreme

Court approved

that

approach again setting forth what the law is in Utah.

The

same facts exist in this case.
Tallev v. Tallev. 739 P.2d
that

evidence

absolutely

as

to

necessary

83

reasonableness
to

support

(Utah CA 1987),
of attorney's

an

award.

That

states
fees
is

is
the

current law in Utah and in this case no evidence related to
the requirements of Talley, supra, was presented.
Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P. 2d 138

(Utah 1980) is likewise a

statement by the Utah Supreme Court that expert witness fees
are not to be assessed against one side or the other and to
do so is error.
Each

of

the

above

cited

cases

clearly

address

and

resolve in Appellant's favor at least four of the five issues
raised
court's

on

appeal.

failure

to

The

fifth

consider

issue related
accounts

payable

to the
is

trial

likewise

resolved in Appellant's favor simply based on the principles
5

of common sense.
Respondent

has

chosen

to

ignore

or

only

mention

in

passing what the law is in Utah and consequently places the
principle of the stare decisis "in the back room" out of
sight and out of mind.

If stare decisis

is to have any

meaning and importance whatsoever, then it should be followed
as should the cases relied on by Appellant in his brief and
cited above.
POINT II
RESPONDENT
THAT
THE
CORRECT IN
APPELLANT'S

HAS FAILED TO SHOW
TRIAL COURT
WAS
THE WAY IT VALUED
DENTAL PRACTICE.
A.

Respondent's Assertion that Appellant did not
Object to the Trictl Court's Consideration of
"Goodwill" is Simply Incorrect.
Respondent claims that Appellant did not object at trial
to the issue of goodwill being considered in the valuation of
Dr.

Sorensen7 s

dental

practice.

That

is

not

so!

Mrs.

Sorensen called her expert to place a value on the practice.
(Vol I, R-54-76)

During

this

examination,

Dr.

Austin

testified about his written "qualified" opinion as set out on
Exhibit "D." (See A-3 3 Addendum to Appellant's Brief.)

He

was then cross examined as to how his conclusions relating to
value would change if, for example, Dr. Sorensen was to be
disabled or retire.

(Vol I, R-77-89)
6

At the conclusion of

his testimony, Respondent then moved for admission of Exhibit
"D" and Appellant's counsel immediately objected.
89)

(Vol I, R-

The exhibit and supporting testimony was then received

by the trial court over Appellant's timely objection.

(Vol

I, R-89)
Parenthetically when Dr. Sorensen presented his case,
his accountant testified at no time during the practice had
goodwill ever been shown as an asset (Vol I, R-3 21) and Mr.
Roger

Nuttal,

a

second

accountant,

disputed

goodwill as an asset of the dental practice.

inclusion

of

(Vol II, R-24)

Succinctly put, the issue as to whether or not goodwill
should have been included was presented to the trial court
and there was a proper objection when the trial court was
asked by Mrs. Sorensen to consider it.

This issue is not

being raised on appeal for the first time.
B.
Utah
Follows
the
Approach
of
Other
Jurisdictions
in Holding that "Goodwill"
Should not be Considered as an Asset of a
Professional Practice.
Mrs. Sorensen makes the statement on page seven of her
brief that:

The g o o d w i l l
of
a
professional
proprietorship
is a marital
asset
d i v i s i b l e on divorce.
Id.
The statement is incorrect for two reasons.
7

First, it is

certainly not the law in Utah according to the holding in
Jackson v. Caldwell, 415 P.2d 667 (Utah 1966), where the Utah
Supreme Court succinctly stated that:
Good will cannot arise as an asset of a
partnership where the parties
only
contribute,
as
capital,
their
professional
skill
and
reputation,
however intrinsically valuable these may
be.
Id. at 671.
The
Jackson

holding
have

and

not been

underlying
changed

principles

or modified

set

forth

in

and Jackson

is

still the law in Utah.
Second, while

some jurisdictions

have decided

that a

professional may possess goodwill subject to consideration in
a divorce action, others have correctly reached the opposite
conclusion that it is inappropriate to consider the concept
of professional goodwill as a divisible marital asset.

Based

upon the Utah Supreme Court's statements in Jackson, supra,
and more recent statements of this Court pertaining to the
valuation

of professional degrees in Peterson v. Peterson,

737 P.2d 237 (Utah CA 1987) and Ravburn v. Ravburn, 738 P.2d
238 (Utah CA 1987), Utah follows the latter position and has
specifically rejected the position urged by Respondent.
Utah
Kansas,

is

aligned

with

Pennsylvania

and

Wisconsin,

Texas,

New

in

York

Louisiana,

holding

that

professional goodwill is not a subject for consideration in
the division

of marital

property.
8

Respondent

incorrectly

argues that this approach is antiquated.

To the contrary, it

is the subject of recent contemporary analysis contained in
Holbrook v. Holbrook, 309 N.W.2d 343

(Wis.App. 1981).

A

complete copy of this case has been included in the Addendum
to this Reply Brief.
In Holbrook,

supra, the Wisconsin

Court

of Appeals

reversed the decision of a trial court and directed that the
goodwill attributable to the husband's law partnership be
deleted from the trial court's overall property distribution
and concluded that this was not the correct approach.

It

felt that the better reasoned and more sound analysis was
that which has been the law in Utah since 1966 when Jackson
v. Caldwell was decided.
It criticized the California approach which Respondent
now urges upon this court, as being "a confusion of rules and
methods of valuation, compounded by inconsistencies in logic
and

application

duplication
protection."

of

and

conceptual

spousal

Id. at 353.

support

problems
and

over

denial

possible
of

In so holding that professional

goodwill is not a divisible asset, the court stated:
We are not persuaded that the concept of
professional goodwill as a divisible
marital asset should be adopted in
Wisconsin.
We are not obliged nor
inclined to follow the twisted and
illogical path that other jurisdictions
have made in dealing with this concept in
the context of divorce.
The

concept

of

equal

professional
9

goodwill

evanesces
when
one
attempts
to
distinguish
it
from future
earning
capacity.
Although a professional
business's good reputation, which is
essentially what its goodwill consists
of, is certainly a thing of value, we do
not believe that it bestows on those who
have an ownership
interest
in the
business, an actual, separate property
interestc
The reputation of a law firm
or some other professional business is
valuable to its individual owners to the
extent
that
it assures
continued
substantial earnings in the future.,
It
cannot be separately sold or pledged by
the individual owners.
The goodwill or
reputation of such a business accrues to
the benefit of the owners only through
increased salary.
Id. at 364.
A similar result was reached by the Kansas Supreme Court
in 1982
Mrs.

in Powell v. Powell, 648 P.2d

Powell

had

argued

that

the

trial

218

(Kansas

court

1982).

should

have

placed a "goodwill value" on Dr. Powell's medical practice.
The trial court rejected thait request and the Supreme Court
affirmed stating:
We are not persuaded a professional
practice such as Dr. Powell's has a good
will value. The practice is personal to
the practitioner. When he or she dies or
retires
nothing
remains.
The
professional's files and lists of clients
are of no use to others. The very nature
of a professional practice is that it is
totally dependent upon the professional.
We refuse to adopt the theory that good
will in a professional practice is an
asset subject to division in a divorce
action. The issue is without merit.
Id. at 223 & 224.
10

See also Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1972) a copy
of which has also been included in the Addendum to this Reply
Brief.
As

is

demonstrated

by

decisions

of

the

courts

in

Holbrook, Powell, and Nail, supra, and our Supreme Court in
Jackson, the better rule and in fact, the law in Utah is that
professional goodwill is not an asset which is the subject of
valuation

division

Consequently,
whatsoever

the

on

and

distributing

trial

the

court

"goodwill"

erred
of

in

a divorce

in placing
Dr.

action.

any

Sorensen's

value
dental

practice.
In

addition,

if

this

Court

were

to

adopt

such

an

approach, it would necessarily have to reanalyze and change
its recent decisions regarding requests of litigants to value
professional degrees —

an intangible similar in concept to

professional goodwill.
In the recent cases of Peterson v. Peterson, 737 P. 2d
273 (Utah CA 1987) followed by Ravburn v. Rayburn, 738 P. 2d
238 (Utah CA 1987) this court concluded that:
. . . an advanced degree is or confers an
intangible right which because of its
character, cannot be characterized as
property subject to division between the
spouses.
Peterson at 241.
These cases cited with approval the Colorado case of In re:
Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d
11

75

(1978) and

like

Graham

concluded

that

in Utah

analysis was the appropriate method

a traditional
for making

alimony

adjustments

between the spouses.
Likewise, Graham was also analyzed and approved of by
the

Wisconsin

professional

Court

degree

in

with

Holbrook
a

which

professional's

analogized
goodwill

a
and

stated:
Like an educational degree, a partner's
theoretical
share of a law
firm's
goodwill cannot be exchanged on an open
market: it cannot be assigned, sold,
transferred,
conveyed
or
pledged.
Although
we recognize
the
factual
distinction between a degree-holder and a
partner or shareholder in a law firm, we
think the similarities compel analogous
treatment in a divorce setting. In both
cases, the "asset" involved is not
salable (Footnote) and has computable
value to the individual only to the
extent that it promises increased future
earnings.
There
is a disturbing
inequity
in
compelling a professional practitioner to
pay a spouse a share of intangible assets
at a judicially determined value that
could not be recilized by a sale or
another method of liquidating value.
(Footnote)
As stated
earlier, the goodwill or
reputation
of Quarles
& Brady
is
reflected in John's substantial salary.
This salary was considered in setting the
family support award. To also treat the
goodwill of the law firm as a separate
divisible asset, would constitute double
counting. (Footnote)
Id. at 355.
In the case before this Court, the trial court properly
12

recognized
acquired

that
during

Mrs.
the

Sorensen's
marriage,

educational

were

an

achievements

intangible

asset

reflective of her ability to produce income; the court went
on to conclude that it was not a property right but was taken
into consideration in connection with the award of alimony.
At the same time, the trial court inconsistently placed
a value on a similar intangible of Dr. Sorensen and stated
that it felt:
. . . that the large portion of the value
of the practice has to do with goodwill
and reputation . . . (R 87)
It then awarded this "asset" to Dr. Sorensen while also
ordering him to pay substantial alimony and child support,
the source of which arose solely from the income produced by
Dr. Sorensen practicing dentistry.

This is the same "double

counting" described in Holbrook with the additional inequity
that

Mrs.

Sorensen's

educational

achievements

were

not

considered as an asset on her side of the ledger.
Simply put, the trial court followed the principle of
Peterson

and

Rayburn

in

dealing

with

Mrs.

Sorensen's

educational degrees and ignored those principles in dealing
with Dr. Sorensen's reputation as a dentist, intangibles so
similar as to be nearly indistinguishable from one another.
In Utah, the law related to a professional's goodwill
and/or educational achievements is well established and has
clearly been set forth in Jackson v. Caldwell, Dogu v. Dogu
13

Peterson

v.

Peterson

and

Rayburn

v.

Rayburn,

supra.

In

deciding Dr. and Mrs. Sorensen's case, the trial court did
not follow that law and consequently erred resulting

in a

material unfairness and inequity to Dr. Sorensen.
C.
The Docru v. Doau Decision Precludes
Consideration of Accounts Receivable as
an Asset
in
Connection
with
Dr.
Sorensen's Dental Practice.
Mrs. Sorensen argues that Dogu v. Docru, 652 P. 2d 13 08
(Utah 1982) stands only for the proposition that the trial
court

did

not

professional

abuse

its

corporation.

decision
This

in

valuing

Dr.

Dogu's

argument might have merit

were it not for the Utah Supreme Court's explicit statement
in that case regarding Dr. Dogu's professional corporation's
accounts receivable.
In Doau, supra, the court not only affirmed the trial
court's method of valuing the professional corporation but
defined and elaborated on the* issue of accounts receivable by
specifically

excluding those* receivables

and defining

them

as:

deferred
income from which
respondent may meet h i s ongoing alimony
and c h i l d
support
obligations
to
appellant.
Id. a t 1309.
Like Dr. Dogu, Dr. Sorensen was required to pay alimony
and child support.

Like Dr. Dogu, Dr. Sorensen should be
14

able to use those receivables, if and when paid, to help him
meet his ongoing support obligations.

It was error and not

in keeping with the directives of Dogu, supra, to include the
receivables as an asset to be awarded to Dr. Sorensen.

By so

doing, Mrs. Sorensen received a double benefit and gets not
only the egg but a piece of the goose that lays it.
It is specious to argue that accounts receivable may be
excluded as an asset in one case and included in another case
depending on the whim and will of the trial court when the
language of Dogu, supra, very clearly defines what accounts
receivable are and how they should be handled in relation to
ongoing support obligations.
The same issue was presented to the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin in the case of Johnson v. Johnson, 254 N.W.2d (Wis.
1977) where a trial courts decision to exclude a physician's
accounts

receivable

distribution, was

from

consideration

found to be correct.

in

the

In explaining

decision, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated:
The trial court considered the accounts
receivable as the equivalent to salary.
In considering the amount of alimony and
support to be awarded, it looked to Dr.
Johnson's salary and his ability to pay.
It was not error to view the receivables
as salary. If Dr. Johnson remained with
the clinic the receivables would be paid
as salary.
If he left, they would take
the place of salary while he established
his
new
practice.
Because
the
receivables were viewed as salary, it

15

property
its

would have been error to include them in
the assets available for distribution.
Id. at 201-202.
Similarly, Dr. Sorensen's accounts receivables are his
salary.

If he continues to practice dentistry, he will use

them to pay his salary and from that salary, his sole source
of

income,

will

be

paid

his

alimony

and

child

support

obligations.
The

trial

court

erred

in

including

Dr.

Sorensen's

accounts receivable as an asset of his dental prcictice.
D.
Respondent has not Shown that the Trial Court
Considered Dr. Sorensen's Actual Accounts
Payable in Attributing a Value to his Dental
Practice.
Mrs. Sorensen has briefly and superficially responded to
Dr.

Sorensen's

valuation

of

subtracting
value.

claim

the

that

dental

current

the

trial

practice

accounts

by

payable

court
not
to

erred

in

the

considering

and

arrive

at

a

net

She simply says this was taken into consideration by

her expert in assigning a value to the "intancjible assets"
referred

to

in

Exhibit

Appellant's Brief.)

"D."

(See

A-35

Addendum

to

She goes on to say that this figure was

used in connection with analyzing Dr. Sorensen's receipts and
expenses

over

a

three

year

period

to

determine

average

profits.
Current accounts payable can in no way be characterized
16

as

intangible.

They

are very much tangible

and must

be

deducted from the value of tangible assets to arrive at a net
worth of the tangible assets.

Neither Mrs. Sorensen's expert

nor the trial court considered these current liabilities in
arriving at a value for Dr. Sorensen's dental practice in
spite

of

testimony

from

Dr.

Sorensen's

accountant

that

$10,129.00 in current payables would have to be considered to
arrive at an accurate value. (Vol II, p.23)
Whether
considered

or

in

not

these

determining

payables

the

were

intangible

reviewed
assets

and

is

not

material nor pertinent to the fact they were not considered
in determining the true value of the tangible assets of Dr.
Sorensen's practice.

(i.e., Fair market value of assets such

as furniture and equipment minus outstanding debt equals fair
net value of assets.)
By
created

not
an

considering
unfair

these

imbalance

payables,

in the

the

property

trial

court

distribution

without any justifiable reason.
POINT III
RESPONDENT'S EVIDENCE ON
ISSUE OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
FATALLY DEFECTIVE.

THE
WAS

The trial court's award of attorney's fees was erroneous
not because of a lack of proof relative to Mrs. Sorensen's
need

but

rather

because

the

evidence

required

reasonableness of the fees was totally lacking.
17

as

to

the

There

was

no

testimony,

direct

or

proffered,

which

related to:
1) the necessity of the number of hours
dedicated;
2) the reasonableness of the rate charged
in light of the difficulty of the case
and the result accomplished; and
3) the rates commonly charged for divorce
actions in the community.
All of the above

is required to support the atward as was

clearly stated by the Utah Supreme Court in Kerr v. Kerr, 610
P. 2d 1380, 1384-85

(Utah 1980) and this Court in Tallev v.

Talley, 739 P.2d 83 (Utah CA 1987).

None of the above was

presented, and therefore, there was insufficient evidence to
make the award.
In

addition,

even

assuming

arguendo

that

the

above

evidence is not necessary, the proffer which was presented
was still defective.

The stipulation as to that proffer went

only to the amount of Mr. Healey's fee as reflected on the
proposed

exhibits

excluded

the

fees.

(V & X) .

question

of

The

stipulation

reasonableness

of

specifically
the

requested

The interchange between the Court and counsel clearly

shows that to be the case (See pp. 2 0 & 21 of Respondent's
Brief and Vol I, p. 214 & Vol II, p. 171).
Given these deficiencies, the trial court's attorney's
fee award should be vacated.
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POINT IV
REGARDLESS OF HOW THE TRIAL
COURT'S ACTIONS
REGARDING
EXPERT
WITNESS
FEES
IS
CHARACTERIZED, IT WAS STILL
ERRONEOUS AND CONTRARY TO UTAH
LAW.
The Utah Supreme Court in Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1280
(Utah 1980) held that it was improper for a trial court to
require one party to pay the other party's expert witness
fees related to preparation for and attendance at trial.

In

reversing the trial court's award of those fees characterized
as costs, the court remanded with instructions that the award
be adjusted to eliminate any fees awarded above the statutory
witness fee rate.

Id. at 1384.

In the case before the Court, the parties had acquired
several pieces of real estate.
whose

fees

are

in

question

Mr. Heiskenan, the expert

appraised

testified on behalf of Mrs. Sorensen.
his

own

appraisers

properties.

to

testify

as

to

each property

and

Dr. Sorensen called
the

value

of the

In comparing the testimony of each appraiser

with the ultimate decision of the trial court as to value, it
is clear that all of Mr. Heiskenan's values were accepted by
the trial court whereas none of the values presented by Dr.
Sorensen's appraisers were utilized in the overall property
distribution.

It

is

also

important

to

note

that Mr.

Heiskenan's fees not only included fees related to preparing

19

the appraisals but also fees related to his testimony at
trial.
Respondent first argues that because of certain pretrial proceedings which required Dr. Sorensen to advance the
sums

necessary

to

secure

appraisals

with

the

ultimate

decision as to responsibility for payment to be reserved for
trial,

Dr.

challenging

Sorensen
the

now

is

propriety

in
of

some way
the

trial

precluded

from

court's

order

requiring him to pay a portion of those fees.
Respondent next argues that the fees which Dr. Sorensen
was ordered to pay are something akin to attorney's fees
thereby giving the trial court discretion to make an award of
the same.

Both arguments are without merit and in conflict

with the law as set out in Kerr, supra, and Frampton v.
Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980).
First, the ultimate responsibility
fees was reserved for trial.

for the Heiskenan

Dr. Sorensen by approving of

that approach in no way waived his right to challenge any
award to be made nor did he expressly or impliedly consent to
any such award being made prior to the time the issue was
actually decided by the court.

There is nothing in the

record to support the claim that at any time Dr. Sorensen
agreed to pay any portion of the Heiskenan fees.
clearly

That is

shown by the fact that the issue as to ultimate

responsibility for payment was reserved for trial.
20

Second, the trial court by apportioning Mr. Heiskenan's
fees did something that the Utah Supreme Court has said it
cannot do.

It said so in Kerr, supra, also a divorce case

and in Frampton. supra.

Simply put, under the holdings of

those cases, a trial court cannot order one party to pay the
expert

witness

statutory

of

another

authorization.

There

authorization

fees

related

party
is

no

to expert witness

absent

specific

such

statutory

fees

in divorce

actions as is clearly apparent from the Kerr holding.
Likewise,

to

argue

that

the

trial

court

has

such

authority under § 30-3-3 U.C.A. (1953), ignores the fact that
that statute was in effect when Kerr was decided and the very
clear statement in Frampton that there are some expenses of
litigation that simple have to be born by the party incurring
the expense.
There is a distinction to be understood
between the legitimate and taxable
"costs" and other "expenses," of
litigation which may be ever so
necessary, but are not properly taxable
as costs. (Footnote)
Consistent with
that distinction, the courts hold that
expert witnesses cannot be awarded extra
compensation unless the statute expressly
so provides. (Footnote)
Frampton. supra, at 774.
The argument proposed by Respondent is one which would
require that the holdings of the Utah Supreme Court in Kerr
and Frampton not be followed which is not the prerogative of
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the trial court or this court to do.

The Heiskenan fee award

should be vacated.
CONCLUSION
Appellant raised

five issues on appeal.

Four of the

five have Utah cases directly on point and are dispositive in
Appellant's

favor.

The

fifth

issue,

(i.e.,

failure

to

consider accounts payable), should be decided in Appellant's
favor based on principles of common sense.
The

Appellant

properly

and

timely

objected

to

Respondent's attempt to place a value on the "goodwill" of
Dr. Sorensen's dental practice.

The trial court erred in

overruling that objection and admitting the evidence.
Utah law is clear that the goodwill of a professional
such as a dentist is not an asset subject to division in a
divorce case.
Dr.

The trial court erred in placing a value on

Sorensen's

goodwill

and

subsequently

awarding

that

"asset" to him.
The

trial

court

erred

in

including

Dr.

Sorensen's

accounts receivable as an asset which was ultimately awarded
to him.
are

Under Utah law, a professional's accounts receivable

deferred

income

from

which

ongoing

child

support

and

alimony payments are made.
The trial court simply
accounts

payable

in

ignored Dr. Sorensen's

valuing

22

his

dental

current

practice

and

consequently the value assigned was at least $10,129.00 too
high.
The evidence which Mrs. Sorensen presented in support of
her request for attorney's fees did not include proof on
reasonableness, the necessity of time expended, and rates
commonly charged in divorce actions.

Consequently, the award

should be vacated based on insufficient evidence.
The trial court erroneously ordered Dr. Sorensen to pay
one half of his wife's expert witness fees attributable to
the

real

behalf.

estate

appraiser she called to testify

on her

This is contrary to existing Utah law and the award

should be vacated.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

I

day of January, 1988.

SNT M. KAST]
Attorneys for Appellant or
the Appeal

23

ADDENDUM

24

TABLE OF CONTENTS OF ADDENDUM

Holbrook v. Holbrook. 309 N.W.2d 343 (Wis.
App. 1981)

A-l

Nail v. Nail. 486 S.W.2d 761 (Texas 1972)

A-14

25

HOLBROOK

. HOLBROOK

Wis. 3 4 3

Clt«M»W1sj%pf , 3 t t N . W . 2 d 3 4 3

be alert to advantages of dividing retirement benefits a t time of divorce rather
than postponing actual division until employee spouse retires especially where there
is uncontradicted expert testimony on valuation and there are sufficient assets on divorce to divide present value of such benefits without undue hardship; (4) remand
was required for determination of amount
We note t h a t Young does not cite any of wife's attorney fees and reasonableness
law which contradicts the authorities upon thereof; and (5) goodwill or intangible valwhich our holding is based. We further ue of husband's partnership interest in lawnote that Young does not challenge the firm was not to be included as a marital
manner in which the County gave him no- asset
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and
tice of the pending foreclosure action. He
remanded
with directions.
attacks only the County's failure to give
Reischl the required notice.
a necessary condition to the rendition of a
valid j u d g m e n t In any e v e n t and as to
any of t h e part owners who may be sued,
the result is the same as in any other
suits to foreclose liens where different
parties have an interest in the subjectmatter of the litigation.9*
Id. at 213 (quoting Adams v. West Lumber
Co., 162 S.W. 974 (Tex.Civ.App.1913)).

Order affirmed.

1. Divorce «=»253(3)
Assets of the marital estate are valued
as of the date the divorce is granted.

O I KEY NUMBER STSTCM^

103Wis.2d327
Judith R HOLBROOK,
Plaintiff-Respondent
v.
John S. HOLBROOK, Jr.,
Defendant-Appellant*
No. 80-1290.
Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.
Submitted On Briefs April 15, 1981.
Opinion Released June 4, 1981.
Opinion Filed June 4, 1981.
Review Denied.*
Appeal was taken from an amended
judgment of the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, Robert M. Curley, J., in a divorce action. The Court of Appeals, Moser,
P. J., held that: (1) homestead was properly
valued as of date the divorce was granted;
(2) failure to explain rejection of uncontradicted valuations of two automobiles was
abuse of discretion; (3) trial courts should
* ABRAHAMSON, J.f not participating.

A-l

2. Divorce «=»286(6)
Court of Appeals will not upset a trial
court's valuations of marital assets unless
the valuations are against the great weight
and clear preponderance of the evidence.
3. Divorce <*=»253(3)
A judgment of divorce is granted when
it is orally pronounced from the bench for
purpose of rule that assets of estate are
valued as of date divorce is granted.
4. Divorce <*=» 253(3)
Parties' homestead was properly valued
as of date on which divorce was granted
orally from the bench, i. e., December 10,
1979, rather than as of date of commencement of trial on September 26, 1979, notwithstanding that in t h e interval the market had changed and value of home allegedly had fallen by about five to seven percent.
5. Evidence «=>594
A court is not required to adopt uncontradicted testimony if it is inherently improbable.
6. Divorce <$=»253(1)
Where husband's testimony regarding
blue book value of two automobiles was
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uncontradicted it was abuse of discretion
for divorce court to give no explanation of
its reason for rejecting such valuation.

divorce rather than postponing benefits fo»
a t least 25 years and method of computing
present value was undisputed.

7. Divorce <*=» 252^(4), 253(3)
Valuation and division of pension
rights on divorce is a matter for the trial
court's discretion; there are a t least three
specified ways in which pension rights can
be valued and divided and which, if any,
method is appropriate is a discretionary decision depending on the circumstances, status of the parties and whether the result is
a reasonable valuation.

13. Divorce <t=»252£(2)
Equitable division of marital assets did
not require t h a t homestead be sold and
proceeds divided; rather, conclusion that
wife and four minor children, ages 16,14,11
and three, be permitted to remain in the
home was reasonable. W.S.A. 767.255(7).

8. Courts <*=»26
Exercise of discretion is more than simply making a decision and requires a reasoning process dependent on facts in, or
reasonable inferences from, the record and
a conclusion based on proper legal standards and trial court's failure to set forth
reasoning used to reach a decision is itself
an abuse of discretion.
9. Divorce <*=» 252^(4)
Trial courts should be particularly alert
to advantages of dividing a spouse's retirement benefits at time of divorce rather
than postponing actual division for a number of years until spouse retires.
10. Divorce «=» 252.3(4)
Where there are sufficient assets available at time of divorce to divide present
value of retirement benefits without
causing an undue hardship on either spouse,
such method is preferred, especially where
there is uncontradicted expert testimony on
valuation.
11. Divorce <*=» 252^(4)
Future division of pension rights should
only be used where the record shows that
present value determinations are unacceptably speculative or where there are not
enough assets to equitably require that benefits due in the future be split presently.
12. Divorce <s=»287
Remand for recomputation of husband's pension benefits was required where
divorce court indicated no reason for rejecting distribution of present value at time of

A-2

14. Divorce <t=»240(3)
Award of $60,000 per year for support
to wife, who had custody of four children
ages 16, 14, 11 and three, was not unreasonable where youngest child was partially dis^
abled by cerebral palsy, wife was disabled
by ankle injury and unable to work and
husband was a partner in a large and reputable law firm where he earned $112,000
per year.
15. Divorce «=»308
Family support is to be determined by
assessing the family's need and the paying
spouse's ability to pay.
16. Divorce <*=>226
Before awarding
vorce, the trial court
the spouse receiving
contribution, that the
has the ability to do
fee is reasonable*

attorney fees on dimust determine that
the award needs the
spouse ordered to pay
so and that the total

17. Divorce <*=»287
Although finding that wife was in need
of contribution to her attorney fees was
supported by the evidence, remand for redetermination of amount of divorced wife's
total attorney fees and reasonableness of
that amount was required as such requirement was not satisfied by trial court's determination that $7,500 was a reasonable
contribution.
18. Divorce <*=>252.3(1)
For purpose of division on divorce, the
marital estate did not include goodwill or
intangible value of husband's partnership
interest in reputable law firm; capital
account value was the only value that
should have been assigned to his partner-
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jj|p as an asset, although fact that husband
£*2$£rpartner in a reputable firm was a
j^operiactor to consider in dividing assets
*Pw3l as determining amount of family
jgjSfc
W.S.A. 767.255(6), 767.26(5), 767.-

Mtf

Harry F. Peck and Louise A. Ptacek of
Petrie, Stocking, Meixner & Zeisig, S. C,
Milwaukee, on briefs, for defendant-appellant
Burton A . Stmad of Strnad & Gossens, S.
C Milwaukee, on brief, for plaintiff-respondent.

cally disabled due to cerebral palsy. Judith
worked as a school teacher for the first two
years of the marriage while John attended
law school. After John's graduation from
law school, Judith did not work outside of
the home.
John is currently a partner in the law
firm of Quarles & Brady, and, at the time
of the divorce, was earning $112,000 per
year.
The trial court divided and valued the
assets of the parties, as follows:
Judith: Homestead

Before DECKER, C. J., MOSER, P. J.,
tad CANNON, J.

$ 1,000

1977 Plymouth Voyager Van $ 3,000
Checking and savings accounts
in his name *
Household goods in his possession
$ 2,000
Stock in Ashbourne, Ltd •
ers. The valuation process used by Mr. Powers
is as follows:
a. "gross income from personal services" is
calculated by multiplying billable hours times
the hourly billing rate. Mr. Powers used
John's total billable hours in 1978, 1,569
hours, and multiplied this by a billing rate of
$100 per hour. (There is nothing in the record that indicates that $100 per hour was or
is John's billing rate) The total arrived at
was $156,900.
b. "contribution to overhead" was computed by multiplying "gross income from personal services" ($156,900) times the reciprocal of the percentage of the law firm's gross
income (which is represented by the net income to partners). It was determined that
53.8% of the firm's income was distributed
to partners. The overhead was therefore determined to be 46.2%. The "contribution to

1* No value for either Judith's or John's bank
accounts was determined by the trial court.
The record shows that as of September 26,
1979, Judith had $650 in a checking account
and $1,880 in a savings account There is no
^waVj-for this court to determine the amounts
[the parties had in their individual accounts as
of September 5, 1980, the date of the amended
judgment of divorce. This is a factual determination that should be made on remand by the
trial court.
X. The trial court did not indicate any value for
any such policies.
The trial court ordered that as a further division of the estate, John pay Judith $25,000
forthwith and $500 per month for twenty
months with nine-percent interest on the remaining balance.

A-3

1975 Buick Station Wagon

Cash payment
$ 35,000.*
John: Partnership interest in Quarles;
& Brady (capital account
value of $23,790 plus "intangible or goodwill value"
of $161,330 <)
$185,120

John and Judith Hoi brook were married
on July 28, 1962, and remained married for
eighteen years. At the time of their divorce they had four minor children, ages 16,
14,11 and 3. Their youngest child is physi-

* J W * "goodwill" value was based upon the
fctfwnony by Judith's expert witness, Mr. Pow-

$ 15,000

All securities owned by either
or both of the parties except the stock in Ashbourne,
Ltd.
$ 3,138
Life insurance policies on her
life 2

MOSER, Presiding Judge.
This is an appeal from the property division, family support and attorneys' fees
awards of the amended divorce judgment
dated September 5, 1980. We vacate, in
part, the property division and the award of
attorneys' fees and remand for further
findings consistent with this opinion. We
affirm the family support award.

*

$162,300

Household furnishing*
Cheeking and savings accounts in her name l

5.
6.

See note 5 on page 346.
See note 6 on page 346.
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Additionally, the court valued John's retirement benefits at $12,179, but determined
that the benefits accrued to the date of the
original decision should be equally divided
when John actually receives them, after he
retires.
The court found that John's gross income
was $112,000. Judith was awarded custody
of the children. The court ordered family
support payments to Judith and the children of $60,000 per year, or $5,000 per
month (in addition to the cash payment
ordered as part of the property division).
John was also ordered to pay $1,000 per
month for seven months, and $500 in the
eighth month immediately following the entry of judgment This provision appears to
have been included to cover Judith's attorneys' fees. The court further ordered that
John pay Judith for the income taxes payable for the 1980 temporary family support
and that he pay for all health care costs for
the children.
John makes several claims of error on
appeal regarding the valuation and distribution of the marital estate, as well as the
family support and attorneys' fees awards.
He contends:
1. that the trial court improperly valued:
a. the homestead,
b. the automobiles, and
c. the retirement benefits;
2. that sale of the homestead should
have been ordered:
3. that the $60,000 annual maintenance
award was excessive;
4. that he should not have been required
to contribute to Judith's attorneys'
fees;
overhead" was calculated as $72,488.
($156,900 X 46 2%)
c "salary earned from personal efforts"
was calculated by subtracting the "contribution to overhead" from the "gross income
from personal services*" $156,900 minus
$72,488 equals $84,412.
d "earnings in excess of salary" was calculated by subtracting "salary earned from personal efforts" ($84,412) from gross income
for 1978 ($111,000) resulting in $26,588.
e one-half of "earnings in excess of salary"
was subtracted to allow for income taxes,
with the rounded result of $13,500.

A-4

5. that the trial court erred in finding
that John's partnership has a goodwill
or intangible value which is a marital
asset to be included in the property
division; and,
6. that the trial court erred in establish-ing a goodwill value of $161,300 because the calculation of that figure was
based upon an unproven factual assumption.
VALUATIONS OF HOMESTEAD, AUTOMOBILES AND RETIREMENT
BENEFITS
Homestead
The trial court found that the homestead,
a large brick home on Newton Avenue in
Shorewood, Wisconsin, had a value of $152,300, subject to a mortgage of $41,962. John
claims that the trial court erroneously valued the homestead as of December 1979,
and should have valued it .as of the date of
the commencement of the trial, September
26, 1979. John's expert testified that on
September 26, 1979, the home had a value
of $185,000. Judith's expert testified at the
December 10, 1979, hearing that he appraised the home in August of 1979, and
estimated its value to be $162,000. He testified also that between August of 1979,
and December 1979, the market had
changed and the value of the home had
fallen by about five percent to seven percent.
[1,2] Assets of the marital estate are
valued as of the date the divorce is grantf finally. $13,500 was capitalized over
twenty years at 5'/a% to get a present value
of $161,330
5.
6.

See note 1, supra
No valuation of this stock was included in the
original findings of fact and conclusions of law
or the onginal judgment nor in either the
amended findings of fact and conclusions of
law or the amended judgment. According to
John's testimony, Ashbourne, Ltd. is a familyowned corporation and the stock has no market value
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4d.* This court will not upset the trial
Court's valuations of assets unless the valuations are against the great weight and
clear preponderance of the evidence.8
Weighing the evidence and determining the
credibility of witnesses are matters for the
trial court and, where more than one inference can reasonably be drawn from the
evidence, we are obliged, on review, to accept the one drawn by the trier of fact.*
[3] The divorce in this case was granted
orally from the bench on December 10,
1979.If It is settled law in Wisconsin that
this is the date for determining the value of
assets.11 In the absence of exceptional intervening circumstances,12 we are not at
liberty to conclude that some other date
should have been used.
The valuation of assets is a difficult and
imprecise obligation of a trial judge in a
divorce action. The values of some assets
can fluctuate markedly throughout the
months of a divorce proceeding and, even
on one given date, there may be several
conflicting opinions of the value of a certain
asset As the fact finder, it is the trial
judge who must draw reasonable inferences
and come to reasonable, albeit disputable,
conclusions as to the value of assets as of
the date the divorce is granted.13
[4] In this case, the trial court's valuation of the homestead was properly made as
of the date the divorce was granted and is
not against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence.
7. Dean v. Dean, 87 Wis.2d 854. 871. 275
N.W2d 902. 909 (1979); Sholund v. Sholund,
34 Wis 2d 122. 132, 148 N W 2d 726. 731
(1967)
8. Carty v Carty. 87 Wis.2d 759. 765. 275
N W 2 d 888. 890 (1979); Markham v Markham. 65 Wis 2d 735, 741. 223 N W.2d 616. 619
(1974)
9. Markham, supra note 8. at 741. 223 N W 2d
at 619.
10. A judgment of divorce is "granted" when it
is orally pronounced from the bench. Holschbach v. Holschbaciu 30 Wis.2d 366. 368-69. 141
N.W.2d 214. 216(1966).

A-5

Automobiles
We do find error, however, in the valuation of the automobiles. The only testimony in the record regarding the value of the
automobiles was John's testimony, based on
Bluebook values, that the Buick station
wagon was worth $2,795 and the Plymouth
van was worth $2,675. There was no other
evidence of the value of these automobiles.
However, in the amended findings of fact,
the trial court valued the Buick station
wagon at $1,000 and the Plymouth van at
$3,000.
[5] A court is not required to adopt uncontradicted testimony if it is inherently
improbable.14 However, "[pjositive uncontradicted testimony as to the existence of
some fact, or the happening of some event,
cannot be disregarded by a court or a jury
in the absence of something in the case
which discredits the same or renders it
against reasonable probabilities." "
[6] The trial court gave no explanation
of its reasons for rejecting the uncontradicted valuations of the automobiles. The
failure to set forth its reasoning rendered
its analysis of the valuations incomplete,
and was an abuse of discretion.1* Accordingly, we vacate the trial court's valuation
of the automobiles and instruct the court on
remand to either adopt the uncontradicted
values testified to at trial ($2,795 for the
Buick station wagon and $2,675 for the van)
or to explain what in the case discredited
these valuations or rendered them improbable.
11. See note 7. supra.
12.

See Sholund, supra note 7

13.

See notes 7, 8 and 9, supra

14. Kilgust Heating Div of Wolff, Kubly & Htrstgt Inc v Kemp, 70 Wis 2d 544. 549, 235
N W 2 d 292, 295 (1975)
15. Id (quoting Thiel v. Damrau, 268 Wis. 76.
85. 66 N W 2d 747. 752 (1954))
16. See Wisconsin Ass'n of Food Dealers v. City
of Madison, 97 Wis.2d 426. 434-35, 293 N.W.2d
540. 545 (1980).
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Retirement Benefits
In reference to John's retirement benefits
from Quarles & Brady, the amended findings of fact and conclusions of law equivocally state: "That the pension plan of
Quarles & Brady and salary continuation
program pursuant to the partnership agreement have an aggregate value of $12,179.
That said amount does not truly reflect the
value of the program/' The latter statement apparently refers to the admissions by
the expert who valued the plan at $12,179 ,7
that there were certain errors made in computing that amount 18 The court then went
on, not to divide the present value of the

retirement benefits, but to order that when
they become due "[t]he proceeds shall be
divided equally between the parties based
upon the pension benefits accrued as of the
date of the original Decision in this action."
John contends on appeal that the court
was obligated to distribute the present value of the benefits at the time of the divorce
and that it was error for the trial court to
postpone, for at least twenty-five years, the
division of the retirement benefits.

17. John had two forms of retirement benefits:
a basic pension and a supplemental benefit for
partners. The total retirement benefits were
valued through the use of the following calculation process:

to the supplemental benefits); and second, the
retirement plan applicable to John excluded the
first five years of employment so that the "accrual fraction" for the basic benefit would be
10/35, rather than 10/40= Correcting for both
of these errors, the present value for the benefits would be:

l.

Accrued benefits calculated
a.

average final compensation
$1 11.176.00
X .20
X 20% (provided for in the plan)
X ••/«•
X accrual fraction
(number of years employed divided
by expected total number of employment years at retirement)
8.338.20.
equals accrued basic pension benefit

$

average final compensation
X 5 % (provided for in the plan)
X accrual fraction

$111,176.00
X .05
X

•/»

(number of years as partner divided
by expected number of partnership
years upon retirement)
equals accrued supplement benefit
Present value calculated
a.

basic pension benefit
accrued benefit
X annuity value
X survival factor
X present value discount

$

8.338.20
X 8.0353
X .70084
X .23300

present value of basic pension benefit
$ 10.941.00.
supplemental benefit
accrued benefit
$
X annuity value
X survival factor
X discount for withdrawal prior to
retirement

1.347.59
X 8.0353
X .70084
X .70

present value of supplemental benefit
$ 1.238.00
Total present value of retirement
benefits
$ 12.179.00

18. Two errors were made in this calculation
and were disclosed in the record: first, the
basic pension benefit plan contained a provision limiting the "average final compensation"
amount to $100,000 (this limit does not apply

A-6

[7] In Bloomer v. Bloomer19 our supreme court recognized that the valuation
and division of pension rights is a matter

basic pension
$100,000
X.20
X '•/»•
$ 5.714.00
X 8.0353
X .70084
X .23300
$

7.498,00

supplemental benefits
$111,176.00
X.05
X 7»
$ 1.348.00 (rounded)
X 8.0353
X .70084
X .2330
X .70
$
1.238.00
Total = $8,736.

On remand, should the trial court decide to
presently divide the pension benefits, it must
adjust the present value amount of these benefits as indicated above to account for the undisputed errors in computation used to arrive at
the $12,179 figure. However, the trial court is
not bound by the recalculation set out above to
the extent that it deems it proper to accept
John's argument that the "final compensation"
figure used to begin the calculations should be
the actual income average for the five years
preceding the divorce rather than using the
then-current year's compensation or the $100,000 maximum.
19. 84 Wis.2d 124, 267 N.W.2d 235 (1978).
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for the trial court's discretion.2* The court
explained that there are at least three ways
that pension rights can be valued and divided:
1. the trial court may determine the
amount of the employee-spouse's contribution to the fund, plus interest,
and award the other spouse an appropriate share;
2. the court may award the nonemployee-spouse a share of the present
value of the employee-spouse's retirement benefits when they vest under
the plan. In addition to discounting
to present value, further discounting
should be made to account for the
probability of death before qualification for benefits and for vesting.
Consideration should also be given to
the employee-spouse's life expectancy
as a retiree. This approach may be
too speculative in some situations;21
3. the trial court may determine a fixed
percentage of any future payments
under the employee-spouse's pension
plan attributable to earnings during
marriage to which the nonemployeespouse is entitled22 This requires no
calculation of present value. This
method is best where present value of
a pension fund is difficult or impossible to assess.21
Which, if any, of these methods is appropriate is a discretionary decision dependent
"upon the circumstances of the case, the
status of the parties, and whether the result
is a reasonable valuation of the marital
asset"*
Although it was a discretionary matter
for the trial court to determine which valuation and division method should be used,
20. See id at 134. 267 N.W.2d at 240.
21.

See id at 135, 267 N.W.2d at 241.

22.

See id. at 136. 267 N.W.2d at 241.

23. Selchert v. Selchert, 90 Wis.2d I. 11-12. 280
N.W.2d 293, 298 (Ct.App.1979).
24. Bloomer, supra, 84 Wis.2d note 19, at 135,
267 N.W.2d at 240-41.
23.

See notes 17 and 18, supra.

A-7

the record does not show why the court
determined a present value for the pension
plan ** and then ordered a future divbion of
the payments as they become due
[8] Appellate review of discretionary
decisions is virtually impossible where there
is no record of the trial court's reasoning in
reaching a particular conclusion. Our supreme court has explained that the exercise
of discretion is more than simply making a
decision: it requires a reasoning process
dependent upon facts in, or reasonable inferences from, the record and a conclusion
based on proper legal standards.2* "There
should be evidence in the record that discretion was in fact exercised and the basis of
that exercise of discretion should be set
forth." v The failure to set forth the reasoning used to reach a decision is an abuse
of discretion.28
[9,10] In deciding which method of dividing the retirement benefits should be
adopted in this case, the trial court should
consider the advantages and disadvantages
of the various methods. We believe that a
trial court should be particularly alert to
the advantages of dividing retirement benefits at the time of divorce rather than postponing the actual division for a number of
years until the employee-spouse actually
retires. Determining the present value of
retirement benefits is admittedly speculative, but this is true of valuation of any
asset. We believe that where there are
sufficient assets available at the time of
divorce to divide the present value of the
retirement benefit without causing an undue hardship on either spouse, this method
is preferred. This method is especially preferred where, as here, there is uncontradicted expert testimony on valuation.
26. McCJeary v. State, 49 Wis.2d 263, 277. 182
N.W.2d 512. 519 (1971); see also D. H. v. State,
76 Wis.2d 286. 310. 251 N.W.2d 196. 205
(1977); Stare v. Hutnik, 39 Wis.2d 754, 764,
159 N.W.2d 733, 737-38 (1968).
27. McCleary, supra, 49 Wis.2d note 26, at 277,
182 N.W.2d at 519.
28.

Id at 277-78, 182 N.W.2d at 520.
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[11] Although the future division method adopted by the trial court in this case b
an acceptable method of division, we believe
that it should only be used where the record
shows that present value determinations
. are unacceptably speculative or where there
are not enough assets to equitably require
that benefits due in the future be split
presently.
[12] In this case, the method of computing the present value of the retirement
benefits was undisputed (although the actual computation contained errors which are
corrected in our footnote 18). The court
indicated no reasons for rejecting this
method and for opting for the less preferred future division method. Accordingly, on remand we instruct the trial court to
either adopt the present value method or to
set forth its reasoning, under the facts and
circumstances of this case, for delaying the
division until some undetermined future
date.
SALE OF THE HOMESTEAD
[13] John contends on appeal that in
order to accomplish an equitable division of
the marital estate, the homestead should be
sold and the proceeds divided. We think
the conclusion that Judith and the children
should be permitted to remain in the home
is reasonable. The amount of equity the
Hoi brooks have in the home, the costs and
disruption of moving, the age of the children, and the current cost of financing a
new home are factors which support the
trial court's conclusion. There is also a
statutory preference for this result.2* How
Judith allocates the funds provided by the
property division and family support to cover the upkeep of the home should be left to
her.

[15] Family support is to be determined
by assessing the family's need and the pay.
ing spouse's ability to pay.39 We think both
considerations support the award in this
case.
Judith has the responsibility of feeding,
clothing and generally caring for four minor children, one of whom is, at least to
some extent, physically disabled by cerebral
palsy. The record also shows that Judith is
disabled by an ankle injury which makes
her unable to work. In contrast, John is a
partner in a large and reputable law firm
where he is earning $112,000 a year.
The trial court indicated its reasons for
awarding $60,000 in family support in its
memorandum decision written in response
to a motion to amend the original findings
of fact and conclusions of law and the original judgment. The court indicated that it
had reexamined the award and declined to
change its determination that the amount
was fair and reasonable. The court, determined that, although two of the children
were approaching the age of majority, the
award should not be changed and when the
children do reach majority, John can bring
a motion for reduction of family support
based on the change of circumstances.
The memorandum decision and the findings of fact and conclusions of law indicate
that the trial court exercised its discretion
based upon proper factors and set forth at
least some of its reasoning in the record.
We find no abuse of discretion and therefore defer to the trial court's judgment

FAMILY SUPPORT
[14] Judith was awarded $60,000 per
year for family support. John contends
that this is excessive. We do not believe
that the family support award is unreasonable under the circumstances in this case.

ATTORNEYS' FEES
Originally, John was ordered to pay $15,000 toward Judith's attorneys' fees. On
reconsideration of this issue, the court stated:
The court has again reviewed the file and
determines that that would be the
amount of [Judith's attorneys'] total fee
and agrees with counsel for the defend-

29. Sec. 767 255(7) (formerly sec. 247.255(7)).
Stats.

30. See Czatcki v. Czaicki, 73 Wis.2d 9. 18. 242
N.W.2d 214, 218 (1976).
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ant that to require defendant to pay the
total fee would be unfair. Therefore the
court sets as a reasonable contribution,
under Anderson v. Anderson, 72 WisJM
631,242 N.W.2d 165f the sum of $7,500 to
be paid in the manner described earlier.
The court further finds that there is a
demonstrated need for the plaintiff to
receive this assistance by way of a contribution and further there is a demonstrated ability on behalf of the defendant to
pay the same, and that the sum fixed by
the court is a fair and reasonable sum.

satisfied by the trial court's determination
that $7,500 was a reasonable contribution.
It must first be determined what the total
fee actually is and whether it is reasonable.
Without this determination, we cannot review the reasonableness of the contribution.
INCLUSION OF GOODWILL AS
AN ASSET
The major dispute in this appeal focuses
on the trial court's determination that the
goodwill or intangible value of John's partnership interest in Quarles & Brady is a
marital asset which must be considered in
the property division. John also disputes
the court's determination that this asset
had a value of $161,300.a He claims that
the method of calculating this value was
based on completely unsupported factual
assumptions, specifically, the assumption of
a $100 per hour billing rate.

[16] Before awarding attorney's fees,
the trial court is required to make the following factual determinations:
1. the spouse receiving the award needs
the contribution;
2. the spouse ordered to pay has the
ability to do so; and,
3. the total fee is reasonable (this provides guidance in determining what is
John contends that the intangible or
a reasonable contribution).31
goodwill value of the partnership is not an
[17] John disputes the trial court's deasset or any kind of property. He argues
termination that Judith needed the contribution to her attorneys' fees. We do not that the only property interest in the partbelieve that the trial court's finding of need nership consists of his "capital account" of
was against the great weight and clear $23,790.96, the contractually determined,
fixed amount payable to him upon withpreponderance of the evidence.
drawal from the firm.
However, we must, nonetheless, remand
the issue to the trial court for a determina[18] We conclude that the trial court
tion of the amount of Judith's total attor- erred in determining that the marital estate
neys' fees and the reasonableness of that included the goodwill value of John's partamount "In the absence of some indica- nership. We therefore do not address the
tion as to what the total fee is, this court is issue of the method of valuation.
left to surmise as to whether the proper
balance was struck between the former
wife's needs and the divorced husband's Defining the Concept
ability to pay." 52 This requirement is not
Goodwill has been defined thusly:
31. Selchert, supra, 90 Wis.2d note 23, at 15-16.
280 N.W.2d at 300 (Ct.App. 1979); see also Anderson v. Anderson, 72 Wis.2d 631, 646, 242
N.W.2d 165. 172 (1976).
32. Anderson, supra note 31, at 646, 242 N.W.2d
at 173. Although the court stated in the above
quoted excerpt from its memorandum decision
that the original award of $15,000 would cover
Judith's attorneys' total fee, we find no indication from the record of the actual amount of
attorneys' fees owed. In the trial brief, Judith's
attorneys state that Judith "incurred substantial expense in the litigation of this matter" due
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to the use of many experts, the custody dis-.
pute, various motions, depositions and conferences with doctors and experts. It was asserted that many hours were spent preparing for
trial. In conclusion it was asserted that "a
reasonable contribution towards attorneys' fees
and expert witness fees would be $13,500.00."
It is not at all clear if that was meant to be a
statement of what the total fee was. If so, we
are at a loss to determine where the court
arrived at its original $15,000 figure.
33. See note 4, supra.
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[TJhe advantage or benefit which is acquired by an establishment beyond the
mere value of the capital stock, funds, or
property employed therein, in consequence of the general public patronage
and encouragement which it receives
from constant or habitual customers on
account of its local position, or common
celebrity, or reputation for skill or affluence, or punctuality, or from other accidental circumstances or necessities, or
even from ancient partiality or prejudices.34
The favor which the management of a
business wins from the public . . .
The
fixed and favorable consideration of customers arising from established and wellconducted business . . . . The favorable
consideration shown by the purchasing
public to goods known to emanate from a
particular source . . . .
Something in
business which gives reasonable expectancy of preference in race of competition.3*
Originally, goodwill was said to exist only
in commercial business, and not in a professional business which depends upon the skill
and reputation of a particular person.*1
Because goodwill has no existence apart
from the business to which it attaches,
courts have determined that there can be no
income tax deduction for loss of goodwill; **
the loss of goodwill cannot be compensated
for in eminent domain proceedings; M goodwill cannot be used to satisfy debts; * nor
is it subject to depreciation.4*

In an article criticizing the rather unst*
ble and inconsistent development ot^tht,
concept of professional goodwill in marital
dissolutions in California, Ira Lurvey yumxa
out that some view goodwill as something
that can only be ascertained upon the actual sale of a business.41 However, "(sjuch
protection of the real marketplace is missing . . . from the hypothetical sale ordered
on dissolution of marriage. There is neither a real buyer nor a real seller.'" ** Mr.
Lurvey asserts that in light of this and the
other attributes of goodwill discussed above
it is:
at least arguable that "goodwill,"1 by
whatever name designated, is only an ejh
try in an accounting statement arrived at
by hindsight to accommodate any amount
paid or received on transfer of a going
business beyond the value attributable to
its tangible assets.
Thus at best "goodwill1* is intangible.
It is also amorphous, ephemeral, elusive;
and, by general definition, speculative
and uncertain except to the extent that it
has already been established by an armslength bargaining in the open market
place.43

34. 38 Am.Jur.2d. Goodwill § 1 (1968); see J.
Story, Commentaries on the Law of Partnerships § 99 at 170 (6th ed. J. Gray, ed., 1868).

39. Id. citing Ulienthal v. Dnicklieb, 84 F. 918,
918-19 (C.C.N.Y.1898).

35. Black's Law Dictionary 625 (5th ed. 1979)
[citations omitted.]
36. Am.Jur.2d, Goodwill § 8 (1968); Lurvey,
Professional Goodwill on Marital Dissolution:
Is It Property or Another Name for Alimony7
Jan./Feb. 1977 Gal.State Bar J. 27, 29 (hereinafter Lurvey).
37. Lurvey, supra note 36, at 29 citing Red Wing
Malting Co. v. Willcuts,' 15 F.2d 626, 633 (8th
Cir. 1926).
38. Id. citing inter alia 27 Am.Jur.2dt Eminent
Domain § 287.
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Professional Goodwill as a Marital Asset in
Other Jurisdictions
With an apparent lack of deliberativeness, the California courts have developed
the view that the goodwill of a professional
practice is an asset which must be accounted for upon dissolution of a marriage.44

40. Id. citing Red Wing Malting Co. v. Willcuts,
15 F2d 626. 629, 632-34 (8th Cir. 1926).
41.

Id. at 30.

42. Id.
nal.]
43.

[Footnote omitted, emphasis in origi-

Id

44. Id. at 30, 78-83. Golden v. Golden, 270
Cal.App.2d 401, 404-05. 75 Cal.Rptr. 735. 73738 (1969) is often cited as the leading case for
this rule. Golden involved a medical practice
in which the husband was a sole practitioner.
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However, the cases are inconsistent in their
treatment of goodwill. It is not clear
whether it is truly a separate asset to be
valued and divided,4* or whether it is actually "the vehicle whereby the established
employment or earning capacity of the husband, which often 'constitutes the most valuable economic asset of the parties/ was
divided as community property."4* The
California position is further obscured by
the determination in one case involving the
dissolution of a law partnership and not a
divorce, in which it was ruled that goodwill
cannot be divided between partners when a
law partnership is dissolved because it had
attached to the individual partners, had no
monetary value, and could not be sold.47
Subsequently, in the first California divorce
case involving the issue of goodwill in
which the husband-professional was not a
sole practitioner, but a partner,48 the court
stated that the existence and value of goodwill must be determined regardless of
"whether related to that of a sole practitioner, a professional partnership or a professional corporation." *•
The California rule has been adopted in
Washington.5*
The California approach has been deservedly criticized as a "confusion of rules
and methods of valuation, compounded by
45. See Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal App 2d 786, 79293, 78 Cal.Rptr. 131. 135-36 (1969)
46. Lurvey, supra note 36, at 82 [emphasis in
original] quoting In re Mamage of Rosan, 24
CaLApp.3d 885. 898. 101 Cal.Rptr. 295, 304
(1972).
47. Lyon v. Lyon, 246 Cal.App.2d 519. 54 Cal.
Rptr. 829. 833 (1966).
48. In re Mamage of Lopez, 38 Cal App 3d 93,
113 Cal Rptr. 58 (1974)
49. Id at 109, 113 Cal Rptr at 68; see Adams,
Professional Goodwill as Community Property
How Should Idaho Rule?, 14 Idaho L Rev 473
(1978).
50. See In re Mamage of Lukens, 16 Wash App
481. 558 P2d 279 (1976) This case conflicts
with the early Washington case of Lockhart v.
LockharU 145 Wash. 210, 259 P 385 (1927). m
which the court, although recognizing the ex300 NWJ24—9
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inconsistencies in logic and application and
conceptual problems over possible duplication of spousal support and denial of equal
protection.*'Sl
An equally criticizable and anomalous situation exists in Texas where the inclusion
of professional goodwill as an asset in the
marital estate is dependent upon whether
the professional involved is a sole practitioner or a member of a professional partnership or corporation.
Nail v. Nail9* involved an opthalmologist
who had established a sole medical practice.
The Texas Supreme Court determined that
the goodwill of a sole practitioner's business
does not possess value or constitute an asset
separate from the individual and his ability
to continue practicing and would cease to
exist if the individual withdrew from the
business.M Accordingly, the supreme court
determined that the wife's community interest in the medical business did not extend to the enhanced value attributable to
goodwill. This enhanced value, the court
said, was merely an expectancy completely
contingent on the continuation of existing
circumstances and therefore was not a vested property right subject to division upon
divorce.54

istence of goodwill in a professional business,
ruled that upon divorce a wife is not entitled to
a portion of its value because goodwill attached
to the husband and could be abandoned at any
time. Id at 213, 259 P at 387, Adams, supra
note 49. at 479.
51. Lurvey, supra note 36, at 85. To the extent
that the recognition of goodwill in divorce is
really an effort to divide "the value that had
accrued during the marriage to the establishment of the husband's career, in whatever field,
and his resultant income," the equal protection
question anses* Is it not an arbitrary and capricious distinction to apply the doctrine only to
professional spouses, individually or as partners, but not to salaried employees 7 Id at 84
52. 486 S W 2d 761 (Tex. 1972)
53.

Id. at 764.

54.

Id
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However, in Geesbreght v. Geesbreght**
the court of civil appeals determined that
goodwill may exist as an asset of a professional partnership or corporation separate
from any individual member. That case
involved a multi-member medical corporation, which the court said could acquire its
own reputation or goodwill, despite changes
in personnel. Hence, the goodwill of the
corporation should be accounted for in evaluating the practitioner's interest in the
business. 54
The inconsistencies and inequity of the
distinctions of Nail and Geesbreght have
been noted and criticized.57
Even greater problems arise when, after
it has been determined t h a t professional
goodwill is a marital asset divisible upon
divorce, attempts are made to place a dollar
value on the goodwill that is part of the
marital estate. This would be especially
problematic, where, as here, the business
involved has several members, all of whom
have presumably contributed to the goodwill of the business. Valuation of one individual's goodwill interest in the business
would be almost pure speculation.
Professional Goodwill in Wisconsin
We are not persuaded that the concept of
professional goodwill as a divisible marital
asset should be adopted in Wisconsin. We
are not obliged nor inclined to follow the
twisted and illogical path that other jurisdictions have made in dealing with this
concept in the context of divorce.
The concept of professional goodwill evanesces when one attempts to distinguish it
from future earning capacity. Although a
professional businesses good reputation,
which is essentially what its goodwill consists of, is certainly a thing of value, we do
not believe that it bestows on those who
have an ownership interest in the business,
an actual, separate property interest. The

reputation of a law firm or some other
professional business is valuable to its individual owners to the extent that it assures
continued substantial earnings in the future* It cannot be separately sold or
pledged by the individual owners. The
goodwill or reputation of such a business
accrues to the benefit of the owners only
through increased salary.
We think this case is analogous to the
situation in DeWitt v. DeWitt** in which
this court determined that a professional
education or the increased earning capacity
t h a t it confers upon the spouse who holds it
is not a divisible marital asset, even though
t h e acquisition of the degree is partly attributable to the earnings and efforts of the
other spouse. This court quoted, with approval, the reasoning of In re Marriage of
Graham: **
An educational degree . . . is simply not
encompassed even by the broad views of
the concept of "property." It does not
have an exchange value or any objective
transferable value on an open market It
is personal to the holder. It terminates
on death of the holder and is not inheritable. It cannot be assigned, sold, transferred, conveyed, or pledged. An advanced
degree is a cumulative product of many
years of previous education, combined
with diligence and hard work. It may
not be acquired by the mere expenditure
of money. It is simply an intellectual
achievement that may potentially assist
in the future acquisition of property. In
our view, it has none of the attributes of
property in the usual sense; of that term.
It was further explained in DeWitt that
valuing a professional degree as a marital
asset necessarily requires division of the
post-divorce earnings of the degree-holding
spouse, which is inconsistent with the requirement that only assets acquired during
marriage can be divided.*

55. 570 S.W.2d 427 (Tex.Civ.App.1978) writ dismissed.

58. 98 Wis.2d 44, 53-54, 296 N.W.2d 761. 766
(Ct.App.1980).

56.

Id. at 436.

59.

57.

Note. 11 St. Mary's L.J. 222 (1979).

60. DeWitt, supra, 98 Wis^d note 58, at 54. 296
N.W.2d at 766.
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Like an educational degree, a partner's
theoretical share of a law firm's goodwill
cannot be exchanged on an open market: it
cannot be assigned, sold, transferred, conveyed or pledged. Although we recognize
the factual distinction between a degreeholder and a partner or shareholder in a law
firm, we think the similarities compel analogous treatment in a divorce setting. In
both cases, the "asset" involved is not salable *' and has computable value to the individual only to the extent that it promises
increased future earnings.
There is a disturbing inequity in compelling a professional practitioner to pay a
spouse a share of intangible assets at a
judicially determined value that could not
be realized by a sale or another method of
liquidating value.*1
There is no dispute in this case that upon
withdrawal from the partnership, John
would be entitled to receive only his capital
account value of $23,790. Ethically and
contractually, he is prevented from otherwise disposing of his interest in Quarles &
Brady. The capital account value is the
only value that should have been assigned
to his partnership as an asset
As stated earlier, the goodwill or reputation of Quarles & Brady is reflected in
John's substantial salary. This salary was
considered in setting the family support
award. To also treat the goodwill of the
law firm as a separate divisible asset, would
constitute double counting.0 The fact that
John is a partner in a reputable law firm is,
however, a proper factor to consider in dividing the assets, as well as determining the
amount of family support.*4 If circumstances warrant future amendment of the

family support award, this may be done.**
We think that this is a more direct and
reasonable way of accounting for John's
professional position.
Judith's contribution to the furtherance
of John's legal career is reflected in the
home, furnishings and other tangible assets
that the family has acquired over the years.
Indeed, she was awarded a great deal of
these family assets in the divorce.
Accordingly, we vacate the trial court's
valuation of John's partnership to include
goodwill and order on remand that the undisputed value of $23,790 be assigned to
that property.
That part of the judgment regarding the
family support award is affirmed; the valuation and disposition of the homestead are
also affirmed. The remainder of the property division section of the judgment is
vacated and the matter remanded for further findings consistent with this opinion
with regard to the following items: the
valuation of the automobiles, the valuation
of the retirement benefits, the valuation of
the parties' individual bank accounts, the
valuation of the stock in Ashbourne, Ltd.,
and the valuation of John's partnership interest at Quarles & Brady. The portion of
the judgment granting the award of attorneys' fees is vacated and remanded for further findings consistent with this opinion.
The trial court is instructed to reconsider
the division of the assets after these findings are made.

61. Itv contrast, a commercval busvcvess, uncludmg any goodwill value, is salable We do not
think the same inequities anse when the goodwill value of a commercial business is included
in the assessment of the total worth of the
business for purposes of property division
See Spheens v Spheens, 37 Wis 2d 497, 50407, 155 N W 2d 130, 134-36 (1967)

dude, a. pcoftt-sKacux^ txust as aa asset CQC
property division purposes and then also as an
income source to be considered in awarding
alimony. The same rule was applied in Johnson v Johnson, 78 Wis 2d 137, 143, 254 N W 2d
198, 201-02 (1977) to the accounts receivable
of a medical business

See Note, 11 St Mary's L.J 222, 230 (1979)

64. See sees. 767 255(6) (previously 247 255(6))
and 767 26(5) (previously 247 26( 1 Xe)). Stats

63. See Kronforst v Kronforst, 21 Wis 2d 54.
63-64, 123 N.W 2d 52S-534 (1963) in which the
supreme court found that it was error to m-

65. See sec. 767 32(1) (previously 247 32(1)).
Stats.

62.
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James B. NAIL, Jr., Petitioner,
v,
Alice J. NAIL, Respondent.
No. B-3317.

Supreme Court of Texas
Nov. 8, 1972.

Divorce proceeding
The District
Court, No 89, Wichita County, Driver, J„
granted divorce to wife and divided property of parties and the husband appealedThe Fort Worth Court of Civil Appeals,
Second Supreme Judicial District, Brewster,
J , 477 S.W.2d 395 affirmed and the husband brought error The Supreme Court.
Steakley, J , held that accrued good will of
husband's medical practice did not constitute property subject to division as part
of parties' estate.
Reversed and remanded.

divorce proceeding the accrued good will of
the medical practice of the husband, a doctor of medicine specializing in Ophthalmology, based as it is on his personal skill,
experience and reputation, as well as upon
his continuing in the practice, constitutes
property that is subject to division as part
of the estate of the parties The trial court
and a divided court of civil appeals considered that it was 477 S W 2 d 395. We
hold that it was not.
The problem is posed in this manner.
Petitioner, Dr. James B Nail, Jr and his
wife, Alice J Nail, Respondent, were married m 1945. He was subsequently licensed to practice mediane and has practiced in Wichita Falls, Texas, since 1956.
His wife sued him for divorce which was
granted by judgment dated August 12,
1971. The court ordered a division of the
estate of the parties and that which is questioned here is the following grant to Alice
J. Nail in the decree of divorce:

Divorce <§=>249(3)
«£>
&$*

4HMHfeHH

*

•HHIWI!

dm

*m

mw T.C.A.

Family Code, §§ 3 59, 3 63, Vernon's AnnCivSt arts. 2328b-4, § 2(f), 4637.

Fillmore, Parish, Martin, Kramer & Fillmore, Howard L. Martin, Wichita Falls,
for petitioner.
Fnberg, Martin & Richie, Gene Richie,
Wichita Falls, for respondent.

STEAKLEY, Justice.
Section 3.63 of the Texas Family Code l
requires the Court in a decree of divorce
to "order a division of the estate of the
parties in a manner that the court deems
just and right .
. " The controlling question here is whether in this

"The Court finds that the value of
Alice J. Nail's community interest in said
medical practice, including the good will
accrued thereto, to be the sum of $40,000 00. This sum shall be paid to Alice
J Nail by James B Nail, Jr at the rate
of $400 00 per month for a period of
twenty-four
(24) months beginning
August 1, 1971, and continuing to July 1,
1973
Beginning August 1, 1973, the
monthly payments from James B. Nail,
J r to Alice J Nail shall be reduced to
$300 00 per month and shall continue
thereafter until the total sum of $40,000.00
shall have been paid by James B. Nail,
J r to Alice J. Nail, or until the said
James B Nail, J r shall cease to practice medicine "
The supporting findings of fact and conclusions of law of the trial court were
these *
"That except for the cruel conduct on
the part of the said James Barry Nail,
Jr. to Alice Jane Nail, the marriage could
have continued.

I. Vernon's Texas Codes Annotated, Family Code.
486 S.W 2 d - ^ 8 V a
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"That had the marriage continued,
Alice Jane Nail would have had the benefit of community income in the approximate sum of $53,000.00 per year.
"That during their marriage, James
Barry Nail, Jr., completed his pre-medical
education, graduated from medical school,
completed his internship and his residency in opthalmology.
"That Alice Jane Nail and James
Barry Nail, Jr., accumulated and now
own the following community property:
(a) The house and lots located at 4502
Martinique Street, Wichita Falls,
Texas;
(b) Valuable household fixtures, furnishings and appliances located in
the home at 4502 Martinique Street,
Wichita Falls, Texas,
(c) The medical practice of
Barry Nail, Jr.,

James

(d) Two automobiles; and
(e) One boat and motor.
"There are no liquid assets owned by
the community estate of Alice Jane Nail
and James Barry Nail, Jr.
"That the value of the assets of the
medical practice of James Barry Nail,
Jr., is $131,759.64, including all fixtures,
furniture, equipment, and the value of
the good will that has accrued thereto
during the marriage of Alice Jane Nail
and James Barry Nail, Jr.
"That the approximate value of Defendant's office equipment and office
furniture is $735.47.
'That James Barry Nail, Jr., has an
earning capacity of approximately $52,000.00 per year.
"That the earning capacity of James
Barry Nail, Jr., will increase in subsequent years.
"That Alice Jane Nail is not trained
for any employment
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"I conclude from a consideration of the
respective ages of the parties, their earning capacities and abilities, the conduct
of the Respondent toward the Petitioner,
what the Petitioner could have reasonably expected to receive from a continuation of the marriage, except for the conduct of the Respondent, and from all other
factors that it is fair and equitable to
grant to the Petitioner Alice Jane Nail,
the following property •
(a) .

.

.

(b) .

.

.

(c) .

.

.

(d) A community interest in the medical practice of James Barry Nail, Jr.,
in the sum oi $40,000.00, which said
sum shall be payable at the rate of
$400 00 per month for a period of 24
months beginning August 1, 1971, and
continuing until July 1, 1973. Beginning August 1, 1973, the monthly payments of James Barry Nail, Jr. to Alice
Jane Nail should be reduced to $300.00
per month and continue thereafter until
the total of $40,000.00 shall have been
paid by James Barry Nail, Jr., to Alice
Jane Nail, or until the said James
Barry Nail, Jr. shall cease to practice
medicine;
. . . "
It is to be observed that the decree of
the court was not based upon a permissible
agreement between the parties for support
payments to the wife after divorce; nor
was it in terms of a court imposed personal
obligation of the husband for support of the
wife after divorce that would constitute
permanent alimony not sanctioned by the
statutes and public policy of Texas. See
Francis v. Francis, 412 S.W.2d 29 (Tex.
1967), Art. 2328b-4, § 2(f), Art. 4637, Vernon's Ann.Civ.St, and Sec. 3.59 of the Texas Family Code. Rather, the decree in the
respects under attack purported to be an
exercise of the discretionary powers of the
trial court in effecting a just and right division of the estate of the parties.
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As noted, the trial court found the value
of the husband's medical practice to be
$131,759.64, inclusive of fixtures, furniture,
equipment and accrued good will; but the
court further found the value of the furniture and equipment to be only approximately $735.47, thus leaving a valuation of
accrued good will in the sum of $131,024.17.
The further finding that the wife's community interest therein was $40,000.00 was
derived, at least in part, from the testimony
of a witness offered by the wife as an expert that the valuation of the good will of
a professional practice would have "a starting point" of "multiplying one full year's
billings by one or one and a half". This
seems so in light of the trial court finding
that the husband had an annual earning
capacity of approximately $52,000, one and
one-half of which would be $78,000. In any
event it is apparent that the award to the
wife of $40,000, payable in future monthly
installments if, and so long as, the husband
practiced his profession, rested upon the
conclusion that the accrued good will of
the husband's practice constituted property
which was subject to division by the court.
Alice J. Nail asserts that the problem
is solved by precedents in our State which
recognize that a professional man can acquire and voluntarily sell good will. Cited
are Randolph v. Graham, 254 S.W. 402
(Tex.Civ.App. 1923, writ ref'd) where it
was stated that "[t]he good will of a professional man may be as much an asset
and a thing to be sold as that of a merc h a n t " ; Sanderfur v. Beard, 249 S.W.
274 (Tex.Civ.App.1923, no writ) and
Yeakley v. Gaston, 50 Tex.Civ.App. 405,
111 S.W. 76S (Tex.Civ.App.1908, no writ).
So it is said, the husband's medical practice
with its good will was owned by the marital
partners; and as such, it was property in
existence at the time of the divorce that was
subject to valuation and partition in a manner within the discretion of the trial court.
We have found no case in point and
solution of the problem is not easy. The
division of authority on the question of
whether good will may exist in a profession
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dependent on personal qualities of the
owner has been stated in this manner:
" . . . It has frequently been held
that good will does not adhere to a business or profession dependent solely on
the personal ability, skill, integrity, or
other personal characteristics of the
owner. According to other decisions,
however, good will may exist in a professional as well as a commercial business, and may be sold together with the
estate, and, irrespective of whether there
is technically a good will adherent to a
business or profession dependent on personal qualities of the owner, contracts
disposing thereof coupled with an agreement that the seller would not compete,
if otherwise valid, are enforced. In any
case, an involuntary sale cannot be made
of a good will based on professional
reputation. 38 C J . S . Good Will § 3,
pp. 952-953
It is generally held that good will has no
existence as property in and of itself, as a
separate and distinct entity, but only as an
incident of a continuing business having
locality or name. 38 Am.Jur.2d, Good Will,
§ 3, p. 914, and cases there cited. The rule
has been otherwise stated that as good will
must adhere to some principal property or
right, the extinction of such right operates
to extinguish the good will dependent on it.
38 C J . S . Good Will § 4, p. 953. It has been
held that good will cannot be levied upon
in satisfaction of debts.
Lilienthal v.
Drucklieb, (Cir. 1898) 84 F. 918. It is the
rule in Tennessee that there can be no
forced sale or transfer of good will based
upon professional reputation and standing
against one not assenting. Hunt v. Street,
182 Tenn. 167, 184 S.W.2d 553 (Tenn.1945) ;
Slack v. Suddoth, 102 Tenn. 375, 52 S.W.
180, 45 L.R.A. 589. The distinction has
been drawn that professional good will is
not so much fixed or as localized as the
good will of a trade, and attaches to the
person of the professional man or woman
as a result of confidence in his or her skill
and ability. Finch Bros. v. Michael, 167
N.C. 322, 83 S.E. 458 (1914).
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In any event, it cannot be said that the
accrued good will in the medical practice
of Dr. Nail was an earned or vested property right at the time of the divorce or that
it qualifies as property subject to division
by decree of the court. It did not possess
value or constitute an asset separate and
apart from his person, or from his individual ability to practice his profession. It
would be extinguished in event of his death,
or retirement, or disablement, as well as in
event of the sale of his practice or the loss
of his patients, whatever the cause. Cf.
Busby v. Busby, 457 S.\V.2d 551 (Tex. 19/0),
and the cases there referred to with approval, where the husband's existing entitlement to future military retirement benefits
was held to constitute a vested property
right. The crucial consideration was the
vesting of a right when the husband
reached the requisite qualifications for retirement benefits; the fact that the benefits were subject to divestment under certain conditions did not reduce the right to a
mere expectancy. The good will of the
husband's medical practice here, on the
other hand, may not be characterized as
an earned or vested right or one which
fixes any benefit in any sum at any future
time. That it would have value in the
future is no more than an expectancy
wholly dependent upon the continuation of
existing circumstances. Accordingly, we
hold that the good will of petitioner's medical practice that may have accrued at the
time of the divorce was not property in the
estate of the parties; and that for this
reason the award under attack was not
within the authority and discretion vested
•in the trial court by Section 3.63 of the
Texas Family Code.
It is to be understood that in resolving
the question at hand we are not concerned
with good will as an asset incident to the
sale of a professional practice, or that rriay
exist in a professional partnership or corporation apart from the person of an individual member, or that may be an element of damage by reason of tortious conduct.
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The judgments below arc reversed and
the cause is remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

Jimmy Lee JACKSON, Appellant,
v.
The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 40224.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Get. IK, 1972.
Rehearing Denied Doe. <;, 11)72.

Defendant was convicted in the Criminal District Court Xo. 5, Dallas County,
Av.U., Utt\ lkv>svt v.wd Ed (v5ss<ctt, J}., <z>i
robbery by assault, and he appealed. The
Court of Criminal Appeals, Davis, C, held
that evidence including victim's identification of defendant as man who stabbed and
robbed him and testimony of police officer
that property taken from victim was found
on defendant's person shortly after robbery
was sufficient to support defendant's conviction.
Affirmed.

1. Robbery C=24(l)

Evidence including victim's identification of defendant ::? man who stabbed and
robbed him and testimony of police officer
that property taken from victim was found
on defendant's person shortly after robbery
was sufficient to support defendant's co:>

2. Indictment and Information C=M68
The specific allegation in an indictment when two or more defendants are
charged with the same offense that defend-
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